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The ongoing financial crisis has spurred much finger-pointing at fair value accounting for 
financial instruments, as set out in both leading sets of accounting standards used by listed 
companies around the world, namely US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(US  GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Prominent financial 
leaders such as Martin Sullivan, CEO of AIG, and Henri de Castries, CEO of AXA, have 
singled out fair value and the related wide use of mark-to-market accounting as a major factor 
in the crisis
1. Echoing these views, European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy expressed his 
concern on 1 April this year about the ‘impact of mark to market valuation when markets 
generally become illiquid and irrational’
2.  
On closer inspection, there is not just one criticism of fair value accounting, but two, 
centering respectively on illiquidity and procyclicality. The illiquidity criticism focuses on 
complex products resulting from securitisation of assets such as mortgage loans, which are at 
the core of the current financial crisis. Both IFRS and US GAAP define the fair value of 
financial instruments under a three-level framework: it is set as the observable market price of 
the instrument, or (absent the former) the observable market price of a similar item, or (if 
none of the previous two can be found) the result of a financial valuation model. The 
illiquidity criticism notes that market conditions of many complex financial instruments since 
last August are marked by an imbalance between supply and demand, which means that 
market prices are rendered abnormal by the evaporation of liquidity and may bear no relation 
to underlying value defined as the potential to generate future cash flows. Indications of price 
for instruments that may be considered ‘similar’ for accounting purposes (the second level in 
the fair value definition), such as the ABX indices published by the financial information firm 
Markit, have considerably dropped in value since August 2007, and trading volumes on the 
indices are themselves limited. Thus, the argument goes, fair value obliges banks to record a 
drop in value unjustified by economic fundamentals, with a corresponding reduction in 
shareholders’ equity. To maintain their solvency ratios, they are then forced either to raise 
new capital under depressed valuation conditions to the detriment of existing shareholders, or 
to reduce lending with the risk of a depressive effect on the economy as a whole
3.  
The procyclicality criticism is much broader in scope. According to it, the very idea that 
market prices when observable provide the best possible indication of value is flawed, 
because it boosts the apparent robustness of banks’ balance sheets at the top of the cycle and 
reduces it by the same measure at the bottom. The champions of this arguments frequently 
refer to economic research which has shown for decades that markets are often imperfect, 
even in normal times and all the more so in periods of speculative bubbles or of collective 
                                                 
1 See Jennifer Hughes and Gillian Tett, ‘An unforgiving eye: Bankers cry foul over fair value accounting’, 
Financial Times, 14 March 2008.  
2 Charlie McCreevy, testimony before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament, 1 April 2008. 
3 See for example Paul De Grauwe, ‘Act now to stop the markets’ vicious circle’, Financial Times, 20 March 
2008. panic, especially because of information asymmetries and differences among market 
participants in terms of beliefs and behaviour. By granting too much relevance to markets, 
accounting standards would thus be culprits of accentuating both booms and busts. This 
criticism questions fair value accounting not only when applied to illiquid securities, but also 
in much more general terms as the guiding principle for accounting recognition of a broad 
range of financial instruments
4.  
The difficulties to which these criticisms refer are real enough. But the policy conclusion they 
draw, namely that current standards should be temporarily or permanently amended in order 
to restrict the scope of fair value accounting, remains unconvincing, for at least three reasons. 
It does not provide any credible alternatives to the standards currently in force. It disregards 
the negative impact which would result from the loss of data presently supplied by financial 
reporting in compliance with these standards. And it unhelpfully muddies the distinction 
between accounting and prudential concerns, which correspond to different objectives and 
should be more carefully distinguished.  
Critics are at a loss to accompany their arguments with credible counter-proposals. While it is 
straightforward to pinpoint the faults inherent in fair value accounting, it is less easy to 
identify an alternative method which would better fulfill the features of relevance, reliability, 
comparability and understandability which a broad consensus, as well as formal statements of 
principles, assigns to financial accounting standards
5. Reference to historical prices, which is 
sometimes mentioned in this debate, would provide less comparable and much less relevant 
information, and is clearly rejected by users of financial information, prominent among them 
financial investors. Reference to notional prices set by public authorities, which was the 
guiding accounting principle of the collectivised economies of pre-perestroïka Soviet Union 
and of pre-Deng-Xiaoping China, enjoy even lower credibility, at least among most 
economists and capital market participants. When there is a liquid and deep market, the idea 
that accounting entries could be consistently pegged above market prices runs contrary to 
prudence and does not brook scrutiny for long.  
Illiquid financial instruments pose a trickier challenge, but even there, the idea of reducing the 
scope of fair value has not generated credible alternatives to current accounting standards, 
which themselves are hybrid in essence (many assets are outside the scope of fair value) and 
the fruit of decades of trials and errors. One option sometimes proposed is to replace the 
reference to ‘similar’ instruments, central to the present difficulties surrounding securitisation 
products, by an internal valuation model, or ‘mark-to-model’ (under fair value accounting, 
marking to model is allowed only when no market prices can be observed for similar 
instruments). Models are already widely used
6, and they may aid transparency if backed up by 
detailed information about underlying instruments and assumptions. But they also generally 
provide management with considerable scope for determining the key parameters, such as the 
discount rate and future financial flows, and thus influencing the value the model may assign 
to a given instrument. Thus, the vast majority of investors see models as a solution of last 
resort, and tend to prefer market price references when such references exist. As Warren 
Buffett remarked as long as five years ago in a quip that has often been quoted since, ‘in 
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7. For 
investors, reference to an actual market transaction, even an imperfect one, is preferable in 
principle to an internal model elaborated by the issuer.  
Other proposals have been tabled to cushion the accounting shock resulting from the market 
turmoil for financial firms, but none win the day. In a comment piece published on 3 April 
2008 in the Financial Times, three members of the Technical Expert Group of the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG
8), all employees or former employees of large 
listed companies (Bear Stearns, BP and Siemens respectively), proposed a mechanism for 
smoothing market prices over a period of six months to one year to serve as a yardstick for 
writing down financial assets
9. But this proposal, which would dampen the information 
content of financial statements by making them less responsive to market movements, would 
not necessarily help to achieve the objective sought by its authors. In the specific case which 
has focused debate, the use of the ABX indices as a price reference for mortgage-backed 
securities, it would arguably not have significantly improved the lot of banks. As of late April 
2008, and in spite of a recent rebound, the value of these indices has remained depressed for 
more than six months, and an average over this period would still produce an ‘artificially low’ 
value compared with what critics of fair value deem ‘economic fundamentals’
10. 
While the alternatives to fair value do not throw up any obvious answers to the immediate 
needs, they do on the other hand have a potentially harmful feature in common. These 
proposals reduce the information available to investors and other users of financial 
information, and in many cases provide firms with tools to ‘manage earnings’ and to skew 
reporting in a way which fair value accounting, even hit by the drying up of liquidity, does not 
permit or at least not to the same degree. Thus, if such proposals were to be adopted, they 
would most likely entail a higher risk premium for shares generally, and weaker market 
performance. This effect was observed in spectacular fashion in 1990s Japan, when the 
ministry of finance allowed banks to avoid depreciating assets whose value had been reduced 
as a result of market depression. The upshot was an across-the-board loss of confidence in 
banks’ financial reporting, which most observers today think helped to exacerbate the 
financial crisis rather than attenuate it.  
Moreover, the fear associated with a possible overprovisioning of losses due to fair value 
accounting under unusual market conditions is at best only marginally based on empirical 
observation of market behaviour. Over the last few months, markets have on occasions shown 
remarkable resilience to the announcement of sometimes spectacular accounting losses on the 
part of banks. In a particularly noteworthy case, the disclosure by UBS of a $19 billion write-
down in the first quarter of 2008, on 1 April, led to an upsurge of around 15% in the share 
price compared with the closing price of the previous day, which was maintained over 
subsequent trading days. By contrast, episodes where the market abruptly lost confidence in a 
financial firm, for example in Bear Stearns on 13 and 14 March 2008, were not associated 
with new accounting disclosures but with more fundamental fears about intrinsic liquidity and 
solvency. In other words, markets do not appear to be blinded by ‘artificial’ features of 
accounting data. The problems encountered are real and relate to dysfunction of the market 
itself, rather than to the way in which the market is reported through accounting.  
                                                 
7 Warren Buffett, Letter to shareholders, included in the annual report of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. for 2003. 
8 EFRAG is a private organisation consulted by the European Commission before taking its decisions on the 
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Financial Times, 3 April 2008 
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experts’ proposal: Göran Tidström and Stig Enevoldsen, ‘No view formed on the credit crunch’, Financial 
Times, 14 April 2008 At the end of the day, fair value accounting as currently prescribed by IFRS and US GAAP 
standards can be described in analogy with Churchill’s portrayal of democracy, as the worst 
system with the exception of all others
11. Reference to ‘similar items’ such as the ABX 
indices is far from ideal in present circumstances, but this does not warrant a change in the 
standards, as no alternative standard would convincingly lead to better accounting in the 
current troubled market environment. However, this does not imply that the standards, 
whether IFRS or US GAAP, are perfect. They will certainly be subject to amendment in the 
years to come, as the chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board (the IFRS 
standards-setter) has himself recently suggested
12. But the scope allotted to fair value and 
mark-to-market accounting does not seem excessive in light of the characteristics of financial 
markets in the developed world, and of lessons drawn from past crises. Restricting this scope 
would not cure the current ills of markets. On the contrary, it would risk making them worse, 
by reducing the level of confidence which investors and observers have in financial services 
companies’ published accounts.  
Other changes are needed in order to meet the challenges thrown up by the current crisis, 
which indeed is to a significant extent a crisis of financial information. First, deficiencies of 
measurement under current market conditions must be corrected as far as possible by the 
provision of appropriate information in disclosure notes to the accounts. This would allow 
users to put the financial statements into perspective, in particular when they are shaped by 
scrambled market signals. In March 2008 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
clarified and reinforced these information requirements in a letter to all issuers of shares listed 
in the US
13. Comparable recommendations were drawn up by the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) in its report tabled to G7 finance ministers in April 2008
14. The requirements of the 
IFRS standards on this aspect will probably be bolstered in the future, notwithstanding the 
progress already accomplished by the entry into force in 2007 of the IFRS 7 standard on 
disclosures about financial instruments.  
Beyond the standards themselves, how they are applied is a key issue, whose importance is 
often underestimated in Europe. The quality and international consistency of IFRS 
implementation and enforcement is vital to financial stability, as the Banking supervision 
committee of the Eurosystem had stressed before the crisis began
15. From this standpoint, the 
present situation in the European Union is a legitimate cause for concern, as was vividly 
illustrated by a controversy in March 2008 about the accounting policies chosen by Société 
Générale to book the loss caused by the trading activities of its former employee Jérôme 
Kerviel
16. The financial crisis might lead Europeans to revisit their current fragmented setting 
and to contemplate a more credible framework to monitor IFRS implementation, sanction 
improper practice, and provide relevant guidance. For Europeans, this would also go some 
way towards reducing the political risk which would emerge in case of dominant influence of 
the SEC Chief Accountant on global IFRS implementation doctrine
17.  
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Experiment’, Bruegel Blueprint series, April 2007. Moreover, accounting information, including all disclosures mandated by the standards, is 
only one part of the financial information supplied by financial services companies. As the 
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18. It should be contemplated not only for the regulated banking industry, but 
also for non-regulated financial players more broadly
19.  
Last but not least, a sharper distinction must be made than has been the case until now 
between the requirements of financial accounting, as they apply to listed companies in 
particular, and the prudential requirements imposed by supervisors on financial firms. The 
accounting measure of shareholders’ equity is simply not the best way to track bank capital 
for prudential purposes. As we have argued, the pro-cyclical effect of fair value accounting 
does not impair its relevance for the purposes of investors, who need a measure of a 
company’s financial position at a given point of time under that moment’s market conditions. 
However, it would make sense to correct certain multi-year-cycle effects when financial 
information is analysed in a prudential framework. From this point of view, the Basel II 
accord bears weaknesses when tested in the current financial crisis, and is likely to be revised 
in the coming years. The already mentioned FSF report and the corresponding statement of 
G7 finance ministers and central bankers on 11 April 2008 are evidence that this distinction 
between accounting and prudential considerations, often neglected in the recent past, may 
henceforth be properly heeded by public authorities.  
A vigorous debate about fair value is made necessary by the current financial disruption, 
which provides a real-world litmus test of accounting standards. This test has not yet provided 
any reason to revert the choice made in 2000-02 by the European Union to adopt international 
accounting standards designed primarily to meet the financial information needs of investors, 
including the scope of fair value accounting as it is currently defined by IFRS. Even in the 
extraordinary circumstances which have prevailed on financial markets since August 2007, 
breaking or tweaking the financial accounting thermometer would not improve the health of 
the patient, and would only make the doctors’ task that bit harder.  
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